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Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: A Generalized Result


  • Naoto Jinji


We perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival’s strategic variable, taking into account the responses of all other firms. We obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second-order partial derivative of the firm’s payoff function. We then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships (i.e., strategic substitute and complement).

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  • Naoto Jinji, 2013. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: A Generalized Result," Discussion papers e-12-011, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
  • Handle: RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-12-011

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    Cited by:

    1. Finn Christensen, 2016. "Comparative Statics and Heterogeneity," Working Papers 2016-01, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2016.

    More about this item


    comparative statics; asymmetry; stability conditions;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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