IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/1420.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do we see monopoly or duopoly? The influence of perception on entry deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Edward John Dorrell Webb

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University)

Abstract

Consumers have bounded perception and treat similar goods as homogeneous. The interaction between this bias and the structure of firms is studied in a vertically differentiated duopoly with market entry. With fixed costs of quality, natural monopoly and entry deterrence occurs at lower entry costs and incumbent profit is higher. With marginal costs of quality, natural monopoly occurs at higher entry costs or not at all. Deterrence occurs at higher entry costs for mild perceptual limitations and at lower costs for severe limitations. Incumbent profit is generally lower, although for a narrow range of parameter values it may be higher. The incumbent may opt not to enter and no market is created.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward John Dorrell Webb, 2014. "Do we see monopoly or duopoly? The influence of perception on entry deterrence," Discussion Papers 14-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1420
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2014/1420.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "Salience and Consumer Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 803-843.
    2. Michele Piccione & Ran Spiegler, 2012. "Price Competition Under Limited Comparability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 97-135.
    3. Stefan Lutz, 1997. "Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 79-102, February.
    4. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "Salience and Asset Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 623-628, May.
    5. David Buschena & David Zilberman, 1999. "Testing the Effects of Similarity on Risky Choice: Implications for Violations of Expected Utility," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 253-280, June.
    6. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2012. "Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1243-1285.
    7. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2011. "On the strategic use of attention grabbers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
    8. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2015. "Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 7-33.
    9. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
    10. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "Similarity and decision-making under risk (is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 145-153, October.
    11. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    12. Leland, Jonathan W, 1994. "Generalized Similarity Judgments: An Alternative Explanation for Choice Anomalies," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 151-172, October.
    13. Botond Koszegi & Adam Szeidl, 2013. "A Model of Focusing in Economic Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(1), pages 53-104.
    14. Jonathan W. Leland, 2002. "Similarity Judgments and Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 574-581, October.
    15. Ran Spiegler, 2014. "Competitive Framing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 35-58, August.
    16. Hung, N. M. & Schmitt, Nicolas, 1988. "Quality competition and threat of entry in duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 287-292.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    perception; similarity; bounded rationality; vertical differentiation; entry deterrence; oligopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1420. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/okokudk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.