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Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model

  • van Klaveren, Chris

    ()

    (Maastricht University)

  • van Praag, Bernard M. S.

    ()

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Maassen van den Brink, Henriette

    ()

    (University of Amsterdam)

In this paper an empirical model is developed where the collective household model is used as a basic framework to describe the time allocation problem. The collective model views household behavior as the outcome of maximizing a household utility function which is a weighted sum of the utility functions of the male and the female. The empirical research that has been done is mainly focused on testing and refuting the unitary model. Moreover, in the bulk of time allocation literature the main accent still lies on the development of theory. The novelty of this paper is that we empirically estimate the two individual utility functions and the household power weight distribution, which is parameterized per household. The model is estimated on a sub-sample of the British Household Panel Survey, consisting of two-earner households. The empirical results suggest that: (1) Given that the weight distribution is wage dependent, preferences of males and females differ, which rejects the unitary model; (2) The power differences are mainly explained by differences in the ratio of the partners' hourly wages; (3) Although there are significant individual variations on average the power distribution in two-earner families is about even; (4) The male tends to be marginally more productive in performing household tasks than the female (5) The preference for total household production is influenced by family size for the female but not for the male (6) Both males and females have a backward bending labor supply curve.

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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2107.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2107
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  1. Frederic VERMEULEN, 2000. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Working Papers Department of Economics ces0028, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 1998. "Collective labour supply: heterogeneity and non-participation," IFS Working Papers W98/20, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  3. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-48, October.
  4. Jenkins, Stephen P. & Osberg, Lars, 2003. "Nobody to play with? The implications of leisure coordination," ISER Working Paper Series 2003-19, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
  5. Peter Kooreman & Arie Kapteyn, 1990. "On the Empirical Implementation of Some Game Theoretic Models of Household Labor Supply," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 584-598.
  6. Browning, M. & Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Efficient Intra-Household allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," DELTA Working Papers 94-16, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  7. Chris van Klaveren & Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink, 2005. "Intra-household Work Time Synchronization: Togetherness or Material Benefits?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-095/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Martin Browning & Mette Gørtz, 2012. "Spending Time and Money within the Household," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 681-704, 09.
  9. Valerie Lechene & Martin Browning, 2004. "Collective and unitary models: a clarification," Economics Series Working Papers 191, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Apps, P.F. & Rees, R., 1996. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Papers 301, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  11. Chris van Klaveren & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2005. "Intra-household Work Time Synchronization," Labor and Demography 0504005, EconWPA.
  12. Daniel Hallberg & Anders Klevmarken, 2003. "Time for children: A study of parent's time allocation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(2), pages 205-226, 05.
  13. Browning, Martin, 2000. " The Saving Behaviour of a Two-Person Household," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(2), pages 235-51, June.
  14. Hallberg, Daniel, 2002. "Synchronous Leisure, Jointness and Household Labor Supply," Working Paper Series 2002:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  15. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2002. "Timing, togetherness and time windfalls," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 15(4), pages 601-623.
  16. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1997. "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 191-209, February.
  17. Hamermesh, Daniel S, 1999. "The Timing of Work over Time," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 37-66, January.
  18. Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2008. "Out of the Wallet and into the Purse: Using Micro Data to Test Income Pooling," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 43(2), pages 325-351.
  19. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  21. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 2000. "Togetherness: Spouses' Synchronous Leisure, and the Impact of Children," NBER Working Papers 7455, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Jane H. Leuthold, 1968. "An Empirical Study of Formula Income Transfers and the Work Decision of the Poor," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 3(3), pages 312-323.
  23. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
  24. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
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