Manipulable Congestion Tolls
The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion tolls. When large agents are confronted with tolls derived under this parametric assumption but understand the rule used to generate them, the toll system will no longer guide the market to the social optimum. To address this problem, the present paper derives alternate, manipulable toll rules, which are designed to achieve the social optimum when agents anticipate the full impact of their actions on toll liabilities.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (949) 824-5788
Web page: http://www.economics.uci.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jan K. Brueckner & Kurt Van Dender, 2007.
"Atomistic Congestion Tolls at Concentrated Airports? Seeking a Unified View in the Internalization Debate,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2033, CESifo Group Munich.
- Brueckner, Jan K. & Van Dender, Kurt, 2008. "Atomistic congestion tolls at concentrated airports? Seeking a unified view in the internalization debate," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 288-295, September.
- Forbes, Silke J., 2008. "The effect of air traffic delays on airline prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1218-1232, September.
- Daniel, Joseph I, 1995. "Congestion Pricing and Capacity of Large Hub Airports: A Bottleneck Model with Stochastic Queues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 327-70, March.
- Brueckner, Jan K., 2009. "Price vs. quantity-based approaches to airport congestion management," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 681-690, June.
- Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, 2007. "Another Look at Airport Congestion Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1970-1977, December.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, 1976.
"Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem',"
144, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
- Daniel, Joseph I. & Harback, Katherine Thomas, 2008. "(When) Do hub airlines internalize their self-imposed congestion delays?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 583-612, March.
- Brueckner, Jan K., 2005.
"Internalization of airport congestion: A network analysis,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 599-614, September.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2002. "Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 756, CESifo Group Munich.
- Daniel, Joseph I. & Harback, Katherine Thomas, 2009. "Pricing the major US hub airports," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-56, July.
- Daniel, Joseph I., 2001. "Distributional Consequences of Airport Congestion Pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 230-258, September.
- Basso, Leonardo J. & Zhang, Anming, 2007. "Congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 218-237, March.
- Joseph I Daniel & Katherine Thomas Harback, 2008. "Pricing the major hub airports," Working Papers 08-13, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
- Kraus, Marvin & Mohring, Herbert, 1975. "The Role of Pollutee Taxes in Externality Problems," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 42(166), pages 171-76, May.
- Hahn, Robert W., 1982.
"Market Power and Transferable Property Rights,"
402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Daniel, Joseph I. & Pahwa, Munish, 2000. "Comparison of Three Empirical Models of Airport Congestion Pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-38, January.
- Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin, 2006. "Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 229-247, September.
- Pels, Eric & Verhoef, Erik T., 2004. "The economics of airport congestion pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 257-277, March.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2002. "Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1357-1375, December.
- Erik T. Verhoef, 2008. "Congestion Pricing, Slot Sales and Slot Trading in Aviation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-030/3, Tinbergen Institute.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:080915. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jennifer dos Santos)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.