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Desempenho Fiscal e os impactos Sobre as Responsabilidades Fiscal e Social nos Estados e Regiões Brasileiras

Listed author(s):
  • Andrei G.Simonassi
  • Camillo José Oswaldo Cândido Júnior
Registered author(s):

    nível nacional e regional no período 1985-2002, visando tanto a investigar a falácia acerca do eventual trade-off existente entre responsabilidade fiscal e social, quanto a descrever os efeitos dos ciclos políticos e dos dispositivos constitucionais instituídos nas décadas de 1980 e 1990, tais como a emenda da reeleição e o processo de renegociação das dívidas estaduais (Lei no 9.496/1997), sobre a ética de responsabilidade fiscal. Modelos econométricos com dados em painel a efeitos fixos foram estimados em quatro especificações em nível nacional e para as três principais regiões do país como forma de captar os impactos das disparidades regionais sobre as estimativas. Constatase inexistir o trade-off entre as responsabilidades supracitadas em todas as especificações e desagregações. Entretanto, em relação aos determinantes políticos do comportamento fiscal dos estados, enquanto no Nordeste e Sul corroboram os resultados em nível nacional com a existência de ciclos políticos oportunistas e maior controle político advindo da emenda da reeleição, no Sudeste essa emenda contribuiu negativamente com o desempenho fiscal dos estados e os instrumentos de política fiscal, como a lei de renegociação das dívidas estaduais, mostraram-se insuficientes em viabilizar o atendimento aos limites da LRF. The article analyzes the fiscal performance of the brazilian states at national and regional level in the period 1985-2002, aiming to investigate both the fallacy concerning the eventual trade-off between fiscal and social responsibility, and to describe the effects of the political cycles of the constitutional devices instituted in the decades of 1980 and 1990, such as the amendment of the reelection and the Federal Law no 9496/1997 of renegotiation of the state debts under the ethics of fiscal responsibility. Econometric panel data models with fixed effects were estimated in four specifications at national level and other three ones for the main regions of the country so as to capture the impacts of the regional disparities. It is verified that exist no trade-off between such a responsibilities in all of the specifications, aggregated or not, performed. However, in relation to the political determinants of the fiscal policy in the states, the Northeastern and Southern regions match the results with the national level, while indicating the existence of opportunism political cycles and a greater political control from the reelection amendment. Particularly in the Southeast, this policy contributed negatively with the fiscal performance of the states, and the instruments of fiscal policy, such as the law of renegotiation state debts, shown to be ineffective in providing viability to the limits to the Fiscal Responsibility Federal Law (LRF).

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    Paper provided by Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA in its series Discussion Papers with number 1323.

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    Length: 27 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2008
    Handle: RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1323
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    1. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
    2. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    3. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
    4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    5. de Mello, Luiz Jr, 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 365-380, February.
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