Asymmetric Payoffs in Simultaneous and Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Games
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- T. Ahn & Myungsuk Lee & Lore Ruttan & James Walker, 2007. "Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 353-366, September.
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More about this item
Keywordscooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; heterogeneity; exit option;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-09-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2006-09-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-23 (Game Theory)
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