Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
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- Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl, 2013. "Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 508-548, April.
- Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc & Walzl Markus, 2007. "Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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More about this item
KeywordsExperiment; Sender-receiver games; Strategic information transmission; Institutional selection;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-12-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-12-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-12-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2011-12-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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