To What Extent do Latin Americans Trust and Cooperate? Field Experiments on Social Exclusion In Six Latin American Countries
This paper explores the extent to which individuals trust, reciprocate, cooperate and pool risk by using a battery of field experiments containing the trust game, the voluntary contributions mechanism and the risk pooling game; applied in six capital cities in Latin America. The results suggest that: (i) on average, the propensity to trust and cooperate among Latin Americans is remarkably similar to that found in other regions of the world; (ii) expectations about the behavior of other players are the main driver of trust, reciprocity and cooperation; and (iii) behaviors involving socialization, trust and cooperation are closely interconnected.
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