Reciprocity and Network Coordination: Evidence from Japanese Banks
No abstract is available for this item.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1998.
98-33, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2005.
"Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1144-1166, September.
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2003. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," NBER Working Papers 9643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marcel Fafchamps & Susan Lund, 2000.
"Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines,"
Economics Series Working Papers
10, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hst:hstdps:d05-157. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tatsuji Makino)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.