Pyramiding of Family-owned Banks in Emerging Markets
This paper analyzes family-owned banks in Thailand. Using the data before the financial crisis, we find that wealthy families extensively use pyramids to control a business empire which includes financial and non-financial firms. We analyze the entire family group structure and find that one-third of the banks were placed at the second tier near the apex and two-third of the banks were located at deeper tiers in the pyramids. The empirical results show that bottom tier banks have lower performance due to risky loans. This evidence is consistent with the view that when the controlling family maximizes growth and stability of the entire group, lower tier firms are assigned to undertake risky investment. This ownership setting can insulate the entire group from the adverse effect when the investment does not pay off because the family owns relatively low cash flow stake in lower tier firms.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2006|
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- Randall Morck, 2005.
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National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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