Cultural Transmission, Discrimination and Peer Effects
Workers can have good or bad work habits. These traits are transmitted from one generation to the next through a learning and imitation process which depends on parents’ investment on the trait and the social environment where children live. We show that, if a high enough proportion of employers have taste-based prejudices against minority workers, their prejudices are always self-fulfilled in steady state. Affirmative Action improves the welfare of minorities whereas integration is beneficial to minority workers but detrimental to workers from the majority group. If Affirmative Action quotas are high enough or integration is strong enough, employers’ negative stereotypes cannot be sustained in steady-state.
|Date of creation:||24 Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden|
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997.
"Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State,"
Working Paper Series
476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2003.
"Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 533-542, 04/05.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," Working Paper Series 585, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörg Weibull, 2003. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," CESifo Working Paper Series 931, CESifo Group Munich.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2011_0003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sten Nyberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.