Climate Change and Carbon Tax Expectations
If investors fear that future carbon taxes will be lower than currently announced by policy makers, long-run investments in greenhouse gas mitigation may be smaller than desirable. On the other hand, owners of a non-renewable carbon resource that underestimate future carbon taxes will postpone extraction compared with what they would have chosen had the policymakers been able to commit to the optimal tax path. If extraction costs rise rapidly as accumulated extraction rises, near-term emissions increase as a consequence of a downward bias in the expected future carbon taxes. Whether investments in greenhouse gas mitigation go up or down due to the expectation error depends on the time pro…le of the returns to the investment.
|Date of creation:||24 Mar 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Pollution permits and environmental innovation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
- Olli Tahvonen, 1995. "Dynamics of pollution control when damage is sensitive to the rate of pollution accumulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 9-27, January.
- Sinclair, Peter J N, 1992. "High Does Nothing and Rising Is Worse: Carbon Taxes Should Keep Declining to Cut Harmful Emissions," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 60(1), pages 41-52, March.
- Donald A. Hanson, 1980. "Increasing Extraction Costs and Resource Prices: Some Further Results," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 335-342, Spring.
- Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 1994. "The Optimal Time Path of a Carbon Tax," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 857-68, Supplemen.
- Reyer Gerlagh, 2010.
"Too Much Oil,"
2010.14, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Olli Tahvonen, 1997. "Fossil Fuels, Stock Externalities, and Backstop Technology," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 855-74, November.
- Hoel, Michael & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1996.
"Depletion of fossil fuels and the impacts of global warming,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 115-136, June.
- Snorre Kverndokk, 1994. "Depletion of Fossil Fuels and the impact of Global Warming," Discussion Papers 107, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 2008.
"Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 360-394, August.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2008. "Public policies against global warming: A supply side approach," Munich Reprints in Economics 19638, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Jon Strand, 2007. "Technology Treaties and Fossil-Fuels Extraction," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 129-142.
- Michael Hoel, 2009.
"Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy Technology on Greenhouse Gas Emissions,"
2009.1, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Michael Hoel, 2008. "Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy Technology on Greenhouse Gas Emissions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2492, CESifo Group Munich.
- Withagen, Cees, 1994. "Pollution and exhaustibility of fossil fuels," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 235-242, August.
- Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2009. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 200909, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
- Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 2009. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-42, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhiana Bergh-Seeley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.