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Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

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  • Alistair Ulph
  • David Ulph

Abstract

We analyse the optimal design of climate change policies when a government wants to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the relevant carbon taxes (or other environmental policies) that would incentivise such investment by firms will be set in the future. We assume that the current government cannot commit to long-term carbon taxes, and so both it and the private sector face the possibility that the government in power in the future may give different (relative) weight to environmental damage costs. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect: it increases the social benefits of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the private benefit to the private sector to invest. Consequently the current government may need to use additional policy instruments—such as R&D subsidies—to stimulate the required investment. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2013. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 161-176, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:56:y:2013:i:2:p:161-176
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9682-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2011. "End of the line: A Note on Environmental Policy and Innovation when Governments cannot Commit," Documentos de Trabajo 394, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change; Emissions taxes; Impact on R&D; Timing and commitment; H23; Q54; Q55; Q58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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