Why are bids not more unbalanced?
Earlier theoretical models of unbalanced bidding in unit price contracts (UPC) ofter predict corner solutions, i.e. zero bids for unit prices of expected overextimated quantities. However, anecdotal evidence indicates a lack of zero bids in the actual contracts. We pursue a possible explanation for this anomaly in risk-aversion of the contractor. Using a simple model we show that a contractor with superior information may exploit this in the bidding process to increase her expectd revenue. However, in so doing she increases her risk exposure. If the contractor is risk-averse, she typically will avoid a corner solution to this risk vs. expected return trade-off.
|Date of creation:||02 Nov 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden|
Web page: http://www.cts.kth.se/
References listed on IDEAS
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- Ewerhart, Christian & Fieseler, Karsten, 2003.
" Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price Contracts,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 569-581, Autumn.
- Ewerhart II, Christian & Fieseler, Karsten, 2002. "Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price Contracts," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-11, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Working papers 99-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Levin, Jonathan & Athey, Susan, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3612768, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 1999. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers 7185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Arditi & Ranon Chotibhongs, 2009. "Detection and prevention of unbalanced bids," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(8), pages 721-732.
- David William Cattell & Paul Anthony Bowen & Ammar Kaka, 2010. "The risks of unbalanced bidding," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 333-344.
- Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
- David William Cattell & Paul Anthony Bowen & Ammar Kaka, 2008. "A simplified unbalanced bidding model," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(12), pages 1283-1290. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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