Entrepreneurship and the Discipline of External Finance
I confirm the finding that the propensity to start a new firm rises sharply among those in the top five percentiles of personal wealth. This pattern is more pronounced for entrants in less capital intensive sectors. Prior to entry, founders in this group earn about 6% less compared to those who stay in paid employment. Their firms are more likely to fail early and conditional on survival, less likely to be make money. This pattern is only true for the most-wealthy individuals, and is attenuated for wealthy individuals starting firms in capital intensive industries. Taken together, these findings suggest that the spike in entry at the top end of the wealth distribution is driven by low-ability individuals who can afford to start (and sometimes continue running) weaker firms because they do not face the discipline of external finance.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||01 May 2010|
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- Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Joulfaian, David & Rosen, Harvey S, 1994.
"Sticking It Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 53-75, February.
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, 1993. "Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints," NBER Working Papers 4494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, 1993. "Sticking It Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints," Working Papers 698, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..