Are There Fast Tracks in Economic Departments? Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists
In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in our analysis. We find that learning from past performance is an important factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted quickly again. We also find that the handicap is relative, that it does not survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our find- ings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally, we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with different career profiles and find that fast tracks are always more productive than their pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an effective selection process.
|Date of creation:||26 May 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark|
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx
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- Peter Jensen & Michael Rosholm & Mette Verner, "undated".
"A Comparison of Different Estimators for Panel Data Sample Selection Models,"
Economics Working Papers
2002-1, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Jensen, Peter & Rosholm, Michael & Verner, Mette, 2002. "A Comparison of Different Estimators for Panel Data Sample Selection Models," Working Papers 02-1, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Tom Coupé & Valérie Smeets & Frédéric Warzynski, 2006. "Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 137-167, April.
- Coupé, Tom & Smeets, Valérie & Warzynski, Frédéric, 2003. "Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists," Working Papers 03-16, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Tom Coupé & Valérie Smeets & Frédéric Warzynski, 2008. "Incentives, sorting and productivity along the career: Evidence from a sample of top economists," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/101637, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Aycan Çelikaksoy & Helena Nielsen & Mette Verner, 2006. "Marriage migration: just another case of positive assortative matching?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 253-275, 09.
- Celikaksoy, Aycan & Nielsen, Helena Skyt & Verner, Mette, 2003. "Marriage Migration: Just another case of positive assortative matching?," Working Papers 03-27, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Helena Skyt Nielsen & Marianne Simonsen & Mette Verner, 2004. "Does the Gap in Family-friendly Policies Drive the Family Gap?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 721-744, December.
- Helena Skyt Nielsen & Marianne Simonsen & Mette Verner, "undated". "Does the Gap in Family-Friendly Policies Drive the Family Gap?," Economics Working Papers 2003-1, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Nielsen, Helena Skyt & Simonsen, Marianne & Verner, Mette, 2002. "Does the Gap in Family-friendly Policies Drive the Family Gap?," Working Papers 02-19, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1999. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1321-1358. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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