Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?
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Other versions of this item:
- Filges, Trine & Larsen, Birthe, 2000. "Is Unemployment Always Higher When Insiders Decide?," Working Papers 13-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Filges, T. & Larsen, B., 2000. "Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?," Papers 00-02, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark-.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kiander, Jaakko, 1993. "Endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 101-115, August.
- Farber, Henry S, 1978. "Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine Workers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 923-942, October.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-239, May.
- Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
- Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
More about this item
KeywordsInsiders and outsiders; Search; Uemployment;
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
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