IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/aarcls/2000_002.html

Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?

Author

Listed:
  • Filges, Trine

    (Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Aarhus School of Business)

  • Larsen, Birthe

    (Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Aarhus School of Business)

Abstract

This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment when insiders are decisive in the union than if outsiders were decisive in the union.

Suggested Citation

  • Filges, Trine & Larsen, Birthe, 2000. "Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?," CLS Working Papers 00-2, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:aarcls:2000_002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cls.dk/workingpapers/docfiles/67.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kiander, Jaakko, 1993. "Endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 101-115, August.
    2. Farber, Henry S, 1978. "Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine Workers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 923-942, October.
    3. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-239, May.
    4. Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
    5. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-399, April.
    2. Sniekers, F.J.T., 2013. "Endogenous Beveridge cycles and the volatility of unemployment," CeNDEF Working Papers 13-12, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    3. Antonella Trigari, 2009. "Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows, and Inflation Dynamics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 1-33, February.
    4. Berger, Johannes & Strohner, Ludwig, 2020. "Documentation of the PUblic Policy Model for Austria and other European countries (PUMA)," Research Papers 11, EcoAustria – Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Costain, James S. & Reiter, Michael, 2008. "Business cycles, unemployment insurance, and the calibration of matching models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1120-1155, April.
    6. Pieter A. Gautier & Coen N. Teulings, 2000. "The Right Man for the Job: Increasing Returns in Search?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0066, Econometric Society.
    7. Laurence Ball, 1991. "Externalities from Labor Mobility," NBER Working Papers 3720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Thomas, Carlos, 2008. "Search and matching frictions and optimal monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 936-956, July.
    9. Cheron, A., 2005. "Efficient v.s. equilibrium unemployment with match-specific costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 176-183, August.
    10. Messe, P.J., 2011. "Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: The French experience," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 2319-2341, September.
    11. James S. Costain, 1998. "On the quantitative importance of wage bargaining models," Economics Working Papers 262, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    12. Alejandro Justiniano & Claudio Michelacci, 2011. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies in the US and Europe," NBER Working Papers 17429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, 1999. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 719-749, December.
    14. Lange, Fabian & Papageorgiou, Theodore, 2020. "Beyond Cobb-Douglas: Flexibly Estimating Matching Functions with Unobserved Matching Efficiency," IZA Discussion Papers 13177, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Teulings, Coen N. & Watanabe, Makoto, 2014. "Collective versus decentralized wage bargaining and the efficient allocation of resources," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 34-42.
    16. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March.
    17. David M. Arseneau & Sanjay K. Chugh, 2006. "Ramsey Meets Hosios: The Optimal Capital Tax and Labor Market Efficiency," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 222, Society for Computational Economics.
    18. Kenneth Beauchemin & Murat Tasci, 2005. "On the Cyclicality of Labor Market Mismatch and Aggregate Employment Flows," Discussion Papers 05-01, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    19. Maciej K. Dudek & ówna Handlowa, 2006. "On Artificial Structural Unemployment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 171, Society for Computational Economics.
    20. Mathias Hungerbühler & Etienne Lehmann & Alexis Parmentier & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2006. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 743-767.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:aarcls:2000_002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Helle Vinbaek Stenholt The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Helle Vinbaek Stenholt to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hahoadk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.