Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?
This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment when insiders are decisive in the union than if outsiders were decisive in the union.
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- Kiander, Jaakko, 1993. "Endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 101-115, August.
- Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
- Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-39, May.
- Farber, Henry S, 1978. "Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine Workers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 923-42, October.
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