IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/her/chedps/54.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Specialist payment schemes and patient selection in private and public hospitals, CHERE Discussion Paper No 54

Author

Listed:
  • Donald J Wright

    () (Department of Economics, University of Sydney)

Abstract

It has been observed that specialist physicians who work in private hospitals are usually paid by fee-for-service while specialist physicians who work in public hospitals are usually paid by salary. This paper provides an explanation for this observation. Essentially, fee-for-service aligns the interests of income preferring specialist with profit maximizing private hospitals and results in private hospitals treating a high proportion of short stay patients. On the other hand, salary aligns the interests of fairness preferring specialists with welfare maximizing public hospital and results in public hospitals treating all patients irrespective of their length of stay.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald J Wright, 2004. "Specialist payment schemes and patient selection in private and public hospitals, CHERE Discussion Paper No 54," Discussion Papers 54, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney.
  • Handle: RePEc:her:chedps:54
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.chere.uts.edu.au/pdf/dp54.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January.
    2. Kathleen Carey, 2000. "Hospital Cost Containment and Length of Stay: An Econometric Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 363-380, July.
    3. Elena Polverejan & Joseph C. Gardiner & Cathy J. Bradley & Margaret Holmes-Rovner & David Rovner, 2003. "Estimating mean hospital cost as a function of length of stay and patient characteristics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(11), pages 935-947.
    4. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Physician payments;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:her:chedps:54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Liz Chinchen). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/chusyau.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.