An Equilibrium Model of General Practitioner Payment Schemes
In an environment where GPs are of differing quality and heterogeneous patients have di?erent preferences for quality, it is shown that fee-for-service coupled with balance billing is a superior payment scheme to just fee-for-service or capitation payments as it generates an e?cient allocation of GPs between high and low quality and an e?cient allocation of patients between GPs. Where patients have more than one condition it is shown that fee-for-service allows patients to seek treatment from GPs of di?ering quality conditional on the medical condition they have.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Sydney, NSW 2006|
Phone: 61 +2 9351 5055
Fax: 61 +2 9351 4341
Web page: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/economics
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hugh Gravelle & Giuliano Masiero, .
"Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs: capitation in general practice,"
00/18, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Gravelle, Hugh & Masiero, Giuliano, 2000. "Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs: capitation in general practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1067-1088, November.
- Glazer, Jacob & Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 1993.
"Should physicians be permitted to 'balance bill' patients?,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 239-258, October.
- Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire, 1990. "Should Physicians Be Permitted to 'Balance Bill' Patients," Papers 0005, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Elizabeth Savage & Glenn Jones, 2004. "An Analysis of the General Practice Access Scheme on GP Incomes, Bulk Billing and Consumer Copayments," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 37(1), pages 31-40, 03.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Karlsson, Martin, 2007. "Quality incentives for GPs in a regulated market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 699-720, July.
- Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8583. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vanessa Holcombe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.