Payment contracts in a preventive health care system: A perspective from Operations Management
We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser–health provider relationship; i.e. the contracts that maximize the population's welfare while allowing each entity to optimize its own objective function. We show that under certain conditions (1) when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system, and (2) when the number of customers is not verifiable, there exists a contract of bounded linear form and a set of incentive-feasible concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.
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Volume (Year): 30 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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