Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect a newcomer has on incumbent agents. Competition sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional consumer and requires that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused by a newcomer. Resource sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional resource and requires that this is beneficial for some incumbents. For solvable roommate markets, we provide the first characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
|Date of revision:||Dec 2008|
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