IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v34y2006i1p13-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Manabu Toda

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Manabu Toda, 2006. "Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 13-31, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:13-31 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-005-0002-5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel, 1992. "Axiomatizations of the core," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 397-412 Elsevier.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 197-218.
    4. Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu, 1992. "Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 218-227, February.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
    6. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2013. "Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 89-99, January.
    2. Burak Can & Bettina Klaus, 2013. "Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 835-862.
    3. Özkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2010. "Impossibilities for roommate problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 360-363, May.
    4. Thayer Morrill, 2013. "An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 19-28, February.
    5. Klaus, Bettina, 2011. "Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 172-186.
    6. Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus, 2017. "Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 435-455.
    7. Shohei Takagi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2010. "An impossibility theorem for matching problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 245-266, July.
    8. Paula Jaramillo, 2014. "Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 012343, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    9. Paula Jaramillo, 2017. "Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 177-195, January.
    10. repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:43-58 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 257-291.
    12. Biró, Péter & Iñarra García, María Elena & Molis Bañales, Elena, 2014. "A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2014-81, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    13. Yajing Chen, 2017. "New axioms for deferred acceptance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 393-408, February.
    14. Takumi Kongo, 2013. "An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 461-478, February.
    15. Bettina Klaus & David F. Manlove & Francesca Rossi, 2014. "Matching under Preferences," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 14.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    16. Ongena, Steven & Schindele, Ibolya & Vonnák, Dzsamila, 2014. "In lands of foreign currency credit, bank lending channels run through? The effects of monetary policy at home and abroad on the currency denomination of the supply of credit," CFS Working Paper Series 474, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    17. Justin Leroux, 2006. "A discussion of the consistency axiom in cost-allocation problems," Cahiers de recherche 06-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
    18. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 257-291.
    19. Biró, Péter & Iñarra, Elena & Molis, Elena, 2016. "A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Q-stable matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 74-82.
    20. Klaus, Bettina, 2017. "Consistency and its converse for roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 43-58.
    21. Duygu Nizamogullari & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2015. "Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 217-225.
    22. Koji Takamiya, 2013. "Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 115-130, February.
    23. Nizamogullari, Duygu & Özkal-Sanver, İpek, 2014. "Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 34-42.
    24. Péter Biró & Elena Inarra & Elena Molis, 2014. "A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1422, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sided matchings; Maskin monotonicity; Population monotonicity; Consistency; C71; C78;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:13-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.