Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets
For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. In a recent paper, Nizamogullari and Özkal-Sanver (2012) generalize this result to the full domain of marriage markets by adding individual rationality and by replacing anonymity with gender fairness. We generalize both results by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and converse consistency. We also prove that extending this characterization to the domain of solvable roommate markets is not possible.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2013|
|Date of revision:|
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- Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2004. "A note on gender fairness in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 211-217, March.
- Burak Can & Bettina Klaus, 2013.
"Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 835-862, October.
- Burak Can & Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Consistency and Population Sensitivity Properties in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Manabu Toda, 2006. "Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 13-31, April.
- Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
- Bettina Klaus, 2007.
"Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets,"
Harvard Business School Working Papers
09-072, Harvard Business School, revised Dec 2008.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2011. "Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 172-186, May.
- Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 10.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Klaus Bettina, 2007. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets," Research Memorandum 046, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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