Impossibilities for roommate problems
We establish three impossibility results for roommate problems. First, no single valued solution is Pareto optimal and anonymous. Next, no solution satisfies Pareto optimality, anonymity and converse consistency. Finally, no pseudo-refinement of the core satisfies consistency.
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