Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
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- Paula Jaramillo, 2017. "Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 177-195, January.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsschool choice; consistency; Boston mechanism; top trading cycles; minimal consistent enlargement;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-GTH-2015-01-19 (Game Theory)
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