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Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice

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  • Paula Jaramillo

    (Universidad de Los Andes)

Abstract

We consider school choice problems. We are interested in solutions that satisfy consistency. Consider a problem and a recommendation made by the solution for the problem. Suppose some students are removed with their positions in schools. Consider the “reduced” problem consisting of the remaining students and the remaining positions. Consistency states that in the reduced problem, the solution should assign each remaining student to the same school as initially. Neither the immediate acceptance rule (also known as the Boston mechanism) nor the top trading cycles rules is consistent. We show that the Pareto solution is the smallest consistent solution containing the immediate acceptance rule. It is also the smallest consistent solution containing the top trading cycles rule.

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  • Paula Jaramillo, 2017. "Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 177-195, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0954-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0954-3
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    1. Eun Jeong Heo, 2019. "Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 243-266, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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