Connection problems in mountains and monotonic allocation schemes
Directed minimum cost spanning tree problems of a special kind are studied,namely those which show up in considering the problem of connecting units (houses)in mountains with a purifier.For such problems an easy method is described to obtain a minimum cost spanning tree.The related cost sharing problem is tackled by considering thecorresponding cooperative cost game with the units as players and also the related connection games,for each unit one.The cores of the connection games have a simple structure and each core element can be extended to a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas)and also to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.These pmas-es for the connection games result in pmas-es for the cost game.
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Volume (Year): 10 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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- Norde, H.W. & Moretti, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2001.
"Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes,"
2001-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Norde, Henk & Moretti, Stefano & Tijs, Stef, 2004. "Minimum cost spanning tree games and population monotonic allocation schemes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 154(1), pages 84-97, April.
- Norde, H.W. & Moretti, S. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "Minimum cost spanning tree games and population monotonic allocation schemes," Other publications TiSEM bcaf99d7-5b94-437f-a89c-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Maurice Salles, 2005. "Social Choice," Post-Print halshs-00337075, HAL.
- William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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