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A Note on Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Billand

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Christophe Bravard

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Subhadip Chakrabarti

    (QUB - Queen's University [Belfast])

  • Sudipta Sarangi

    (Department of Economics, Louisiana State University - LSU - Louisiana State University)

Abstract

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Sudipta Sarangi, 2014. "A Note on Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies," Working Papers halshs-00924990, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00924990
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00924990
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Hans Haller, 2011. "An Analysis Of Advertising Wars," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(1), pages 100-124, January.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    3. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
    4. Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00796487, HAL.
    5. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
    6. Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Unequal connections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 319-349, October.
    7. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    8. Bastian Westbrock, 2010. "Natural concentration in industrial research collaboration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 351-371, June.
    9. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    10. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Panebianco, Fabrizio & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2016. "Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 11398, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Ying‐Ju Chen & Yves Zenou & Junjie Zhou, 2018. "Competitive pricing strategies in social networks," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 672-705, September.
    3. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Durieu, Jacques & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2015. "Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 203-210.
    4. Ushchev, Philip & Zenou, Yves, 2018. "Price competition in product variety networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 226-247.
    5. Zhao, LiuWei & Du, Jianguo & Wang, QiWei, 2019. "Nonlinear analysis and chaos control of the complex dynamics of multi-market Cournot game with bounded rationality," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 45-57.
    6. Ushchev, Philip & Zenou, Yves, 2018. "Price competition in product variety networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 226-247.
    7. Battaggion, Maria Rosa & Cerasi, Vittoria, 2020. "Strategic interlocking directorates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 85-101.
    8. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P. Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2018. "Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 455-478, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D Collaborations; Network Formation; Multi-market Oligopolies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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