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L'économie politique des réformes fiscales: Une analyse historique

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  • Nicolas Delalande

    (CHSP - Centre d'histoire de Sciences Po (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Cet article vise à souligner le rôle des ressources politiques, des contraintes institutionnelles et des compromis sociaux dans l'élaboration des politiques fiscales. À partir d'une réflexion historique sur quelques-unes des réformes mises en oeuvre depuis le XIXe siècle et de l'éclairage fourni par les acquis de l'économie politique, il aborde trois questions successives : La première est celle de savoir si la démocratie est une condition suffisante à l'adoption de politiques fiscales redistributives. La seconde évalue les contraintes qui pèsent sur l'élaboration et l'application des réformes. Enfin, la troisième définit dans quel contexte politique et économique les réformes ont le plus de chance d'aboutir. Réformer l'impôt suppose de s'appuyer sur une coalition politique cohérente, de surmonter les diverses résistances sociales, institutionnelles et techniques susceptibles d'y faire obstacle, et de savoir tirer profit des circonstances favorables dans lesquelles s'érodent les idéologies et les croyances solidement établies.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Delalande, 2012. "L'économie politique des réformes fiscales: Une analyse historique," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01024598, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01024598
    DOI: 10.3917/reof.122.0035
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01024598
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    References listed on IDEAS

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