The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
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DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03917996v1
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- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(6), pages 3154-3222.
- Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03917996, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Julien Combe, 2023.
"Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 551-584, August.
- Julien Combe, 2022. "Reallocation with Priorities and Minimal Envy Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03951678, HAL.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Peter Troyan, 2022. "Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism," Papers 2206.11359, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
- Schwartz, Jacob & Song, Kyungchul, 2024. "The law of large numbers for large stable matchings," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 241(1).
- Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia, 2022.
"Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 428-453.
- Péter Biró & Flip Klijn & Szilvia Pápai, 2021. "Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market," Working Papers 1255, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
- Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
- Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2024. "Non-vetoed matching with status quo," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Combe, Julien & Nora, Vladyslav & Tercieux, Olivier, 0. "Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
- Caterina Calsamiglia & Antonio Miralles, 2023. "Catchment Areas, Stratification, And Access To Better Schools," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1469-1492, November.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-URE-2023-03-06 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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