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The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

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  • Julien Combe
  • Olivier Tercieux
  • Camille Terrier

Abstract

To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Combe & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier, 2022. "The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(6), pages 3154-3222.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:89:y:2022:i:6:p:3154-3222.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdac002
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    Cited by:

    1. In'acio B'o & Gian Caspari & Manshu Khanna, 2025. "Visibly Fair Mechanisms," Papers 2506.19176, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
    2. Troyan, Peter, 2024. "(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    3. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Eray Cumbul, 2025. "Waitlist engineering in discrete object allocations with outside option," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-22, June.
    4. Combe, Julien & Nora, Vladyslav & Tercieux, Olivier, 2025. "Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(1), January.
    5. Olivier de Groote & Anaïs Fabre & Margaux Luflade & Arnaud Maurel, 2025. "Sequential College Admission Mechanisms and Off-Platform Options," Working Papers hal-05212878, HAL.
    6. Julien Combe, 2023. "Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 551-584, August.
    7. Peter Troyan, 2022. "Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism," Papers 2206.11359, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    8. Yao Cheng & Di Feng, 2025. "On fairness of multi-center allocation problems," Papers 2509.21812, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
    9. Caterina Calsamiglia & Antonio Miralles, 2023. "Catchment Areas, Stratification, And Access To Better Schools," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1469-1492, November.
    10. Yao Cheng & Jingsheng Yu & Ling Zheng, 2025. "Efficient Major Transition Exchange under Distributional and Dual Priority-respecting Constraints," Papers 2504.12727, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
    11. Schwartz, Jacob & Song, Kyungchul, 2024. "The law of large numbers for large stable matchings," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 241(1).
    12. Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
    13. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2024. "Non-vetoed matching with status quo," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    14. Bonifacio Agustín Germán & Amieva Adriana & Neme Pablo, 2025. "Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4780, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    15. Minoru Kitahara & Hiroshi Uno, 2025. "Complete Exchange Mechanisms," Papers 2511.11278, arXiv.org.
    16. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    17. Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia, 2022. "Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 428-453.
    18. Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    19. Mariana Laverde & Elton Mykerezi & Aaron Sojourner & Aradhya Sood, 2025. "Gains from Alternative Assignment? Evidence from a Two-Sided Teacher Market," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1085, Boston College Department of Economics.

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