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Positioning strategies in the case of oligopolistic competition: The case of telecommunications industry in Senegal

Author

Listed:
  • Babacar Ndiaye

    (LARSES - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche en Sciences Economiques et Sociales - UASZ - Université Assane SECK de Ziguinchor)

  • Cheikh Thiaw

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

Innovation is the major instigator in competitive industry. The competition for innovation is traditionally analyzed within the framework of deterministic and stochastic models (Reinganum, 1989). Boone (2001), Fethke and Birch (1982) have respectively analyzed the standard models of competitive strategies in a duopoly and oligopoly industry. By focusing our analysis on deterministic models that is, the models without technological uncertainty, this paper attempts to interpret the model of Boone (2001) in order to determine the choice of positioning in a context of cumulative innovation. Thus, taking into account the case of the telecommunications' sector in Senegal, we try to understand the motivations of the incumbent firm (called first mover) to implement cumulative innovation in order to maintain its position in spite of the investments of entering firms (called follower).

Suggested Citation

  • Babacar Ndiaye & Cheikh Thiaw, 2011. "Positioning strategies in the case of oligopolistic competition: The case of telecommunications industry in Senegal," Post-Print halshs-00864556, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00864556
    DOI: 10.5897/AJBM10.1167
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00864556
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary C. Fethke & John J. Birch, 1982. "Rivalry and the Timing of Innovation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 272-279, Spring.
    2. Dasgupta, Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1980. "Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(358), pages 266-293, June.
    3. F. M. Scherer, 1967. "Research and Development Resource Allocation Under Rivalry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 359-394.
    4. Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
    5. Kamien, Morton I & Schwartz, Nancy L, 1974. "Patent Life and R & D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(1), pages 183-187, March.
    6. Richard A. Jensen, 2001. "Strategic Intrafirm Innovation Adoption and Diffusion," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(1), pages 120-132, July.
    7. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908 Elsevier.
    8. Boone, Jan, 2001. "Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 705-726, April.
    9. Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L. Schwartz, 1976. "On the Degree of Rivalry for Maximum Innovative Activity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 245-260.
    10. Thierry Verdier & J. David Pérez-Castrillo, 1991. "La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(6), pages 1111-1140.
    11. Marion B. Stewart, 1983. "Noncooperative Oligopoly and Preemptive Innovation without Winner-Take-All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 681-694.
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