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Piercing the holding veil to enter family capital: Financialization dynamics and structures of the Peugeot family's capital accumulation 1965-2020

Author

Listed:
  • Quentin Belot Couloumies

    (UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

  • Céline Baud

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

Abstract

Through a longitudinal case study spanning 1965 to 2020, this article scrutinizes the evolution of the influential French Peugeot family's ownership strategies. It elucidates how the family transitioned from industrial management to becoming a significant player in international financial investment. By delving into archival materials and conducting interviews with key executives and family members, this study illustrates the family's adeptness at maintaining control over its industrial empire by associating external financiers and in fine unlocking resources for other lucrative financial ventures. This transformation was facilitated by a sophisticated three-tiered holding structure, which served dual purposes: overseeing capital control and managing private wealth, often through private equity mechanisms. Given the widespread adoption of such financial structures among European corporations and wealthy families, we advocate the need to pierce this "holding veil" to understand capital accumulation transformations for large families in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Quentin Belot Couloumies & Céline Baud, 2025. "Piercing the holding veil to enter family capital: Financialization dynamics and structures of the Peugeot family's capital accumulation 1965-2020," Post-Print hal-04911536, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04911536
    DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwaf005
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04911536v1
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