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Dealing with the ECB's triple mandate?


  • Christophe Blot

    () (OFCE - OFCE - Sciences Po)

  • Jérôme Creel

    () (OFCE - OFCE - Sciences Po)

  • Paul Hubert

    () (OFCE - OFCE - Sciences Po)

  • Fabien Labondance

    (ARPEGE - Atelier de recherche sur la politique économique et la gestion des entreprises - Facultés Universitaires Catholiques de Mons)


The prevailing consensus on the role of central banks has eroded. The pursuit of the goal of price stability only is now insufficient to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability. A new paradigm emerges in which central banks should ensure price stability, growth and financial stability. Recent institutional developments of the ECB go in this direction since it will be in charge of the micro-prudential supervision. In addition, the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area shows that the ECB also remained attentive to the evolution of economic growth. But if the ECB implements its triple mandate, the question of the proper relationship between these missions still arises. Coordination between the different actors in charge of monetary policy, financial regulation and fiscal policy is paramount and is lacking in the current architecture. Besides, certain practices should be clarified. The ECB has played a role as lender of last resort (towards banks and, to a lesser extent, towards governements) although this mission was not allocated to the ECB. Finally, in this new framework, the ECB suffers from a democratic illegitimacy, reinforced by the increasing role it plays in determining the macroeconomic and financial balance of the euro area. It seems important that the ECB is more explicit with regard to its different objectives and that it fulfils the conditions for close cooperation with the budgetary authorities and financial regulators. Finally, we call for the ex nihilo creation of a supervisory body of the ECB, which responsibility would be to discuss and analyze the relevance of the ECB monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2014. "Dealing with the ECB's triple mandate?," Post-Print hal-01072114, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01072114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Céline Antonin & Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Fabien Labondance & Vincent Touze & Paul Hubert, 2014. "Comment lutter contre la fragmentation du système bancaire de la zone euro: Etude spéciale," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7986np0ssj9, Sciences Po.
    2. repec:voj:journl:v:63:y:2016:i:4:p:455-473 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Légé, Philippe & Pereira, Jaime Marques, 2016. "Les hésitations de la parole autorisée durant la crise de la zone euro," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 19.
    4. repec:ilo:ilowps:488129 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Carlos Rodriguez & Carlos A. Carrasco, 2014. "ECB Policy Responses between 2007 and 2014: a chronological analysis and a money quantity assessment of their effects," Working papers wpaper65, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    6. Saraceno, Francesco., 2015. "Challenges for the ECB in times of deflation," ILO Working Papers 994881293402676, International Labour Organization.
    7. Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert, 2017. "What should the ECB "New Normal" look like ?," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4605hhkpf78, Sciences Po.
    8. Céline Antonin & Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance & Vincent Touzé, 2014. "Comment lutter contre la fragmentation du système bancaire de la zone euro ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 171-219.
    9. Francesco Saraceno, 2016. "The ECB: a reluctant leading character of the EMU play," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 33(2), pages 129-151, August.

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