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Central Banking after the Crisis: Brave New World or Back to the Future?

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Abstract

This paper provides a snapshot of the current state of central banking doctrine in the aftermath of the crisis, using data from a questionnaire produced in 2011 and sent to central bankers (from 13 countries plus the euro zone) and economists (31) for a report by the French Council of Economic Analysis to the Prime Minister. The results of our analysis of the replies to the questionnaire are twofold. First, we show that the financial crisis has led to some amendments of pre-crisis central banking. We highlight that respondents to the questionnaire agree on the general principle of a ‘broader’ view of central banking extended to financial stability. Nevertheless, central bankers and economists diverge or give inconsistent answers about the details of implementation of this ‘broader’ view. Therefore, the devil is once again in the details. We point out that because of central bankers' conservatism, a return to the status quo cannot be excluded

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Carré & Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran & Dominique Plihon & Marc Pourroy, 2013. "Central Banking after the Crisis: Brave New World or Back to the Future?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13073
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    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2013/13073.pdf
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    20. repec:pri:cepsud:198blinder is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Alan Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2017. "Necessity as the mother of invention: monetary policy after the crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 32(92), pages 707-755.
    2. repec:ukb:journl:y:2017:i:239:p:6-27 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central banking; financial crisis; financial stability; macroprudential; financial supervision architecture;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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