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Central Banking after the Crisis: Brave New World or Back to the Future? Replies to a questionnaire sent to central bankers and economists

  • Emmanuel Carré

    ()

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7234 - Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC))

  • Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Dominique Plihon

    ()

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7234 - Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC))

  • Marc Pourroy

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

This paper provides a snapshot of the current state of central banking doctrine in the aftermath of the crisis, using data from a questionnaire produced in 2011 and sent to central bankers (from 13 countries plus the euro zone) and economists (31) for a report by the French Council of Economic Analysis to the Prime Minister. The results of our analysis of the replies to the questionnaire are twofold. First, we show that the financial crisis has led to some amendments of pre-crisis central banking. We highlight that respondents to the questionnaire agree on the general principle of a 'broader' view of central banking extended to financial stability. Nevertheless, central bankers and economists diverge or give inconsistent answers about the details of implementation of this 'broader' view. Therefore, the devil is once again in the details. We point out that because of central bankers' conservatism, a return to the status quo cannot be excluded.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00881344.

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Date of creation: Oct 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00881344
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