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Challenges for the ECB in times of deflation

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Listed author(s):
  • Saraceno, Francesco.

Abstract

This paper highlights how European Monetary Union (EMU) governance, as designed by the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent modifications, is unfit to deliver sound and effective macroeconomic management that is conducive to sustained and sustainable economic prosperity for all Europeans.

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File URL: http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2015/115B09_93_engl.pdf
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Paper provided by International Labour Organization in its series ILO Working Papers with number 994881293402676.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2015
Publication status: Published in Employment working paper series
Handle: RePEc:ilo:ilowps:994881293402676
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Keywords: monetary policy; economic recession; deflation; banking; impact evaluation; fiscal policy; EMU; politique monétaire; récession économique; déflation; activité bancaire; évaluation de l'impact; politique fiscale; UEM; política monetaria; recesión económica; deflación; actividad bancaria; evaluación de impacto; política fiscal; UEM;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2014. "Les enjeux du triple mandat de la BCE," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 175-186.
  2. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
  3. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 253-257, May.
  4. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2013. "European economic governance: the Berlin–Washington Consensus," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 479-496.
  5. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, 09.
  6. Blot, Christophe & Creel, Jérôme & Hubert, Paul & Labondance, Fabien & Saraceno, Francesco, 2015. "Assessing the link between price and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 71-88.
  7. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2008. "Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The European Stability Pact," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1143-1168, December.
  8. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2011. "Inequality, the Crisis and After," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 1, pages 9-27, January-M.
  9. Angel Ubide, 2013. "How to Form a More Perfect European Banking Union," Policy Briefs PB13-23, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  10. Jérôme Creel & Paola Monperrus-Veroni & Francesco Saraceno, 2009. "On The Long-Term Effects Of Fiscal Policy In The United Kingdom: The Case For A Golden Rule," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(5), pages 580-607, November.
  11. Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2014. "Dealing with the ECB's triple mandate?," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/53ccj34tat8, Sciences Po.
  12. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/114p6m6s0395gqm0es4g7kgv3u is not listed on IDEAS
  13. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/9909 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco, 2000. "Public investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘golden rule’," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 207-229, June.
  15. Cukierman, Alex, 2013. "Monetary policy and institutions before, during, and after the global financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 373-384.
  16. Jérôme Creel & Francesco Saraceno, 2010. "The Crisis, Automatic Stabilisation, and the Stability Pact," Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 0(1), pages 75-103, January.
  17. Philip Lowe & Claudio Borio, 2002. "Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus," BIS Working Papers 114, Bank for International Settlements.
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Cited by:

  1. Francesco Saraceno, 2016. "The ECB: a reluctant leading character of the EMU play," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 33(2), pages 129-151, August.

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