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Les enjeux du triple mandant de la BCE

Author

Listed:
  • Christophe Blot

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Jérôme Creel

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Paul Hubert

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Fabien Labondance

    (ARPEGE - Atelier de recherche sur la politique économique et la gestion des entreprises - FUCAM - Facultés Universitaires Catholiques de Mons)

Abstract

Le consensus qui prévalait sur le rôle des banques centrales s'est fissuré. La poursuite du seul objectif de stabilité des prix est aujourd'hui insuffisante pour assurer la stabilité macroéconomique et financière. Un nouveau paradigme émarge dans lequel les banques centrales doivent à la fois veiller à la stabilité des prix, à la croissance et à la stabilité financière. Les évolutions institutionnelles récentes de la BCE vont dans ce sens puisqu'elle se voit confier la surveillance micro-prudentielle. En outre, la conduite de la politique monétaire dans la zone euro montre que la BCE est aussi restée attentive à l'évolution de la croissance. Mais, si la BCE poursuit de fait un triple mandat, la question de la bonne articulation entre ces différentes missions continue de se poser. La coordination entre les différents acteurs en charge de la politique monétaire, de la régulation financière et de la politique budgétaire est primordiale et fait défaut dans l'architecture actuelle. Par ailleurs, certaines pratiques doivent être clarifiées. La BCE a joué un rôle de prêteur en dernier ressort (des banques et dans une moindre mesure des États) sans que cette fonction ne lui soit précisément attribuée. Enfin, dans ce nouveau schéma, la BCE souffre d'une illégitimité démocratique, renforcée par le rôle croissant qu'elle joue dans la détermination de l'équilibre macroéconomique et financier de la zone euro. Il nous semble important que la BCE soit plus explicite au regard des différents objectifs poursuivis et qu'elle mette en oeuvre les conditions d'une coopération étroite avec les instances budgétaires et de régulation financière. Enfin, nous appelons à la création ex nihilo d'un organe de contrôle de la BCE, chargé de discuter et d'analyser la pertinence des politiques monétaires mises en place par la BCE.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2014. "Les enjeux du triple mandant de la BCE," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01072116, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01072116
    DOI: 10.3917/reof.134.0175
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01072116
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Dealing with the ECB’s triple mandate
      by Laurence Duboys Fresney in OFCE le blog on 2014-07-18 15:34:37
    2. Les enjeux du triple mandat de la BCE
      by Laurence Duboys Fresney in OFCE le blog on 2014-07-16 19:22:27

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    3. Légé, Philippe & Pereira, Jaime Marques, 2016. "Les hésitations de la parole autorisée durant la crise de la zone euro," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 19.

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