Market Piracy in the Design-Based Industry : Economics and Policy regulation
Market piracy in the design-based industry is an expanding worldwide phenomenon (Grossman and Shapiro, 1988a,b; Chaudhry and Walsh, 1996; Schultz II and Saprito, 1996). It deserves a great deal of attention both because of its impressive international dimension (Verma, 1996) and its intrinsic illegality, ambiguity and powerfull potential links with criminal organizations (Andreano and Sigfried, 1980; Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995). The aim of this paper is to develop theoretical arguments about economic agents' behavior and to shed some light on the main regulatory issues of illegal markets. At a first sight the room for rational incentives to commercial piracy is self-evident. On one hand, an original backpack by the Italian stylist Prada costs, for instance, $ 510 in Manhattan, New York, and a bootleg copy costs $ 70 in Rome, just in front of Castel Sant'Angelo. On the other hand, the number of units sold can be impressive: as an example Louis Vuitton sells 3.5 millions units per year. Market piracy is usually noticed in sectors such as luxury goods or fashion, but piracy can also be observed in more traditional sectors such as car manufacturers, "bureautic" industry, cooking utensils, aircraft-parts and so on.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Economie Appliquée, 2001, LIV, 3, 121-148|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00262515/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1987. "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 265-309, October.
- Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1986.
"Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods,"
NBER Working Papers
1915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Filip Palda, 1998. "Evasive Ability and the Efficiency Cost of the Underground Economy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1118-1138, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00262515. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.