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Loss leaders banning laws as vertical restraints

  • Marie-Laure Allain

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Claire Chambolle

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Cet article étudie un effet pervers inflationniste de l'interdiction de la revente à perte. Dans un modèle où un producteur en monopole vend son produit par l'intermédiaire de distributeurs différenciés, nous montrons que l'interdiction de la revente à perte peut permettre au producteur de limiter la concurrence intra-marque et d'améliorer son profit en augmentant son prix de gros, rétribuant les distributeurs par le biais des marges arrière. L'interdiction de la revente à perte transforme le prix de gros en prix-plancher, augmentant le prix de détail et diminuant le surplus des consommateurs.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00242935.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 2007, 3, 1, 1092-1092
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00242935
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242935/en/
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  1. Claire Chambolle, 2000. "Stratégies de revente à perte et réglementation," Working Papers 2000-52, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  2. Stiglitz, J. & Rey, P., 1988. "Vertical Restraints And Producers' Competition," Papers 13, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  3. Horn, H. & Wolinsky, A., 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies And Incentives For Merger," Papers 410, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  4. Lal, Rajiv & Matutes, Carmen, 1994. "Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(3), pages 345-70, July.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March.
  6. Bergès-Sennou Fabian & Bontems Philippe & Réquillart Vincent, 2004. "Economics of Private Labels: A Survey of Literature," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, February.
  7. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
  8. Bliss, Christopher, 1988. "A Theory of Retail Pricing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 375-91, June.
  9. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
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