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Labour Supply, Service Intensity and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians

Author

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  • Bernard Fortin

    (CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi)

  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bruce Shearer

    (CIRPEE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2019. "Labour Supply, Service Intensity and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02158484, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02158484
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02158484
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Blundell & Alan Duncan & Costas Meghir, 1998. "Estimating Labor Supply Responses Using Tax Reforms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 827-862, July.
    2. Dumont, Etienne & Fortin, Bernard & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Shearer, Bruce, 2008. "Physicians' multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1436-1450, December.
    3. Andreassen, Leif & Di Tommaso, Maria Laura & Strøm, Steinar, 2013. "Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 392-409.
    4. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-90-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Etienne Dumont & Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2008. "Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00305308, HAL.
    6. Devlin, Rose Anne & Sarma, Sisira, 2008. "Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1168-1181, September.
    7. Kalb, Guyonne & Kühnle, Daniel & Scott, Anthony & Cheng, Terence Chai & Jeon, Sung-Hee, 2015. "What Factors Affect Doctors' Hours Decisions: Comparing Structural Discrete Choice and Reduced-Form Approaches," IZA Discussion Papers 9054, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Arthur van Soest, 1995. "Structural Models of Family Labor Supply: A Discrete Choice Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 30(1), pages 63-88.
    9. Guyonne Kalb & Daniel Kuehnle & Anthony Scott & Terence Chai Cheng & Sung‐Hee Jeon, 2018. "What factors affect physicians' labour supply: Comparing structural discrete choice and reduced‐form approaches," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 101-119, February.
    10. Thomas MaCurdy & David Green & Harry Paarsch, 1990. "Assessing Empirical Approaches for Analyzing Taxes and Labor Supply," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(3), pages 415-490.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Bruce Shearer & Nibene Habib Somé & Bernard Fortin, 2018. "Measuring Physicians’ Response to Incentives: Evidence on Hours Worked and Multitasking," Cahiers de recherche 1809, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    2. Bruce Shearer & Nibene Habib Somé & Bernard Fortin, 2018. "Measuring Physicians’ Response to Incentives: Evidence on Hours Worked and Multitasking," Cahiers de recherche 1808, Chaire de recherche Industrielle Alliance sur les enjeux économiques des changements démographiques.

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