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The Effect of Mandatory Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) on Health Insurance Coverage and Labor Force Utilization in Hawaii: Evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 1994-2004

Author

Listed:
  • Sang-Hyop Lee

    () (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Gerard Russo

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Lawrence H. Nitz

    (Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Abdul Jabbar

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Abstract

Using data from the Current Population Surveys, we examine the impact of Hawaii’s mandatory employer-sponsored insurance on health insurance coverage and employment structure in Hawaii. We find empirical evidence of three phenomena. First, private employer-sponsored insurance coverage for full-time workers (more than 20 hours per week) is more prevalent in Hawaii, other things held constant, than in other states and the U.S. as a whole. Second, there is avoidance of the employer-mandate in Hawaii by skirting the 20 hour rule, which changes the both the distribution of employment and the distribution of employment-based insurance coverage by hours worked. Third, Hawaii workers who match with part-time jobs without employer-sponsored health insurance obtain publicly provided health insurance or military coverage with higher probability than their counterparts elsewhere in the U.S. These results suggest that employer mandates induce both higher rates of coverage and labor market sorting.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang-Hyop Lee & Gerard Russo & Lawrence H. Nitz & Abdul Jabbar, 2005. "The Effect of Mandatory Employer-Sponsored Insurance (ESI) on Health Insurance Coverage and Labor Force Utilization in Hawaii: Evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 1994-2004," Working Papers 200512, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:200512
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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_05-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Colla Carrie H & Dow William H & Dube Arindrajit, 2011. "How Do Employers React to a Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early Evidence from San Francisco," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-43, April.
    2. Thomas C. Buchmueller & John DiNardo & Robert G. Valletta, 2011. "The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and the Demand for Labor: Evidence from Hawaii," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 25-51, November.
    3. Pierre, Aurélie & Jusot, Florence, 2017. "The likely effects of employer-mandated complementary health insurance on health coverage in France," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 321-328.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    health insurance; employee sponsored insurance; Hawaii's labor market;

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions

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