Relationships and the availability of credit to New Small Firms
We analyze the loans that startup firms obtain from banks by testing our predictions on a set of small, young Italian companies founded during the 1992-2004 period. According to our investigation, the amount of borrowing is determined by (1) the size of the firm, (2), the ability to offer collateral (3) perceived risk. Contrary to expectations, however, the length of the relationship with the lender has a weak influence.
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|Date of revision:||23 Oct 2011|
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