Information Transmission In Elimination Contests
I consider a two-stage elimination contest with uninformed and informed players. Informed players can signal their type to future uninformed opponents through their efforts in the first stage. Relative to the benchmark case of complete information, I find that an informed player exerts a higher effort in stage 1, if the uninformed future opponent is weaker than him. Conversely, he exerts a lower effort, if the uninformed opponent is stronger than him. This result is consistent with a conjecture in Rosen (AER, 1986). Intuitively, informed players may want to scare future uninformed opponents by exerting higher efforts in earlier rounds. However, trying to scare a stronger player may not be a sensible strategy because he might compete very fiercely. In equilibrium, informed players who are stronger than uninformed players separate from informed players who are weaker than uninformed players. This result differs from Horner and Sahuguet (2003) where stronger informed players pool with weaker informed players.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1|
Phone: (519) 824-4120 ext. 53898
Fax: (519) 763-8497
Web page: https://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002.
"Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies,"
Keele Economics Research Papers
KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Morris, Stephen, 1995. "The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 227-253, October.
- Brunnermeier, Markus K & Parker, Jonathan A, 2004.
CEPR Discussion Papers
4656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Jonathan A. Parker, 2004. "Optimal Expectations," NBER Working Papers 10707, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Parker & Markus K Brunnermeier, 2002. "Optimal Expectations," FMG Discussion Papers dp434, Financial Markets Group.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Jonathan A. Parker, 2002. "Optimal expectations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24954, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jonathan A. Parker & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2004. "Optimal Expectations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 426, Econometric Society.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Jonathan A. Parker, 2002. "Optimal Expectations," Working Papers 146, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Goeree, Jacob K., 2003. "Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 345-364, February.
- Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie & Geanakoplos, John, 1992.
"Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 182-201, April.
- Geanakoplos & Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 1988. "Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 884R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 1989.
- Rick Harbaugh & Tilman Klumpp, 2004.
"Early Round Upsets and Championship Blowouts,"
2004-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Groh, Christian & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Sunde, Uwe, 2003.
"Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
140, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993.
"Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
- Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-545, October.
- Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-289, March.
- Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1985.
"Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,"
NBER Working Papers
1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- William Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 309-328, September.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290, February.
- Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
- Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
- Christopher Avery, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2005-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stephen Kosempel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.