Asymmetry And Collusion In Infinitely Repeated Contests
I show that in an infinitely repeated contest, collusion is easier to sustain when the players are more equal than when they are less equal. Therefore, aggregate rent-seeking expenditures may be lower when the contestants are more equally matched. This is in sharp contrast to the standard result in static rent-seeking contests where increasing asymmetries between players reduce aggregate expenditures. I also discuss how this result has implications for signaling in contests with incomplete information.
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|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1|
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Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
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