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Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures




We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.

Suggested Citation

  • Geanakoplos & Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 1988. "Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 884R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 1989.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:884r
    Note: CFP 819.

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Phillips, P.C.B., 1983. "Exact small sample theory in the simultaneous equations model," Handbook of Econometrics,in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 449-516 Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Enforceable Contracts under Generalized Information of the Court," Discussion Papers 1268, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien, 2015. "Ambiguous language and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 171-180.
    3. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1999. "The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 49-71, July.
    4. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät.
    5. Mathevet, Laurent, 2014. "Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 252-271.
    6. Xiao Luo & Yi-Chun Chen, 2004. "A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 472, Econometric Society.
    7. Meier, Martin, 2005. "On the nonexistence of universal information structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 132-139, May.
    8. repec:pit:wpaper:378 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:eee:matsoc:v:87:y:2017:i:c:p:11-21 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Information Transmission In Elimination Contests," Working Papers 0511, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    11. Fredrik Andersson, 1999. "Uncertainty aversion in a simple insurance model," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 16-27, Spring.
    12. Lo, Kin Chung, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 183-209, November.
    13. Jihong Lee, 2008. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 678-694, April.
    14. Stone, Daniel F., 2011. "Ideological media bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 256-271, May.
    15. Gossner, Olivier & Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Testing Rationality on Primitive Knowledge," Working Papers in Economics 275, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    16. Bernard Walliser, 1991. "Logique épistémique et théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(5), pages 801-832.

    More about this item


    Correlated equilibria; subjective priors; bounded rationality;

    JEL classification:

    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes


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