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Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures

Author

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  • Brandenburger, Adam
  • Dekel, Eddie
  • Geanakoplos, John

Abstract

We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.
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Suggested Citation

  • Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie & Geanakoplos, John, 1992. "Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 182-201, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:182-201
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    Cited by:

    1. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1999. "The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 49-71, July.
    2. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2020. "Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1464-1501, May.
    3. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019. "Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 73-82.
    4. Fredrik Andersson, 1999. "Uncertainty aversion in a simple insurance model," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 16-27, Spring.
    5. Lo, Kin Chung, 2002. "Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 183-209, November.
    6. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2021. "Unawareness without AU Introspection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    7. Jihong Lee, 2008. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 678-694, April.
    8. Jihong Lee, 2008. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 678-694, April.
    9. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Enforceable Contracts under Generalized Information of the Court," Discussion Papers 1268, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien, 2015. "Ambiguous language and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 171-180.
    11. Galanis, Spyros, 2018. "Speculation under unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 598-615.
    12. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration.
    13. Mathevet, Laurent, 2014. "Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 252-271.
    14. Xiao Luo & Yi-Chun Chen, 2004. "A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 472, Econometric Society.
    15. Meier, Martin, 2005. "On the nonexistence of universal information structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 132-139, May.
    16. Oliver Board, 2008. "Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications," Working Paper 378, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2009.
    17. Fiorini, Luciana C. & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2017. "Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 11-21.
    18. Michele Crescenzi, 2022. "Coordination through ambiguous language," Papers 2211.03426, arXiv.org.
    19. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Information Transmission In Elimination Contests," Working Papers 0511, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    20. Áron Tóbiás, 2023. "Cognitive limits and preferences for information," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 46(1), pages 221-253, June.
    21. Stone, Daniel F., 2011. "Ideological media bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 256-271, May.
    22. Gilboa, Itzhak & Samuelson, Larry & Schmeidler, David, 2022. "Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    23. Gossner, Olivier & Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Testing Rationality on Primitive Knowledge," Working Papers in Economics 275, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    24. Bernard Walliser, 1991. "Logique épistémique et théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(5), pages 801-832.
    25. Giovanni Gavetti, 2012. "PERSPECTIVE—Toward a Behavioral Theory of Strategy," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(1), pages 267-285, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes

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