Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
We study the "generalized correlated equilibria" of a game when players make information processing errors. It is shown that the assumption of information processing errors is equivalent to that of "subjectivity" (i.e., differences between the players' priors). Hence a bounded rationality justification of subjective priors is provided. We also describe the set of distributions on actions induced by generalized correlated equilibria with common priors.
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