Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets
A stable matching disrupted by the retirement of workers or the opening, by firms, of positions is said to be firm quasi stable. We prove that, when firms have responsive preferences, the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. The result does not necessarily hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. In this case, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously less preferred by workers and most preferred by firms, to any other element in the set: this is the outcome of he Set Offering Algorithm when we take as input the worker quasi-stable matching above mentioned.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2002|
|Date of revision:||Jun 2007|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Ahmet Alkan, 2001. "original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 99-111.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006.
"A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets,"
Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Game Theory and Information 0401002, EconWPA.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2004. "Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 358-376, April.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2002. "Core Many-To-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods," Working Papers 1140, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods," Game Theory and Information 0302001, EconWPA.
- Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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