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Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets

Author

Listed:
  • David Cantala

    (El Colegio de Mexico)

Abstract

A stable matching disrupted by the retirement of workers or the opening, by firms, of positions is said to be firm quasi stable. We prove that, when firms have responsive preferences, the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching has a lattice structure. The result does not necessarily hold when firms have q-substitutable preferences. In this case, we show that the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a firm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously less preferred by workers and most preferred by firms, to any other element in the set: this is the outcome of he Set Offering Algorithm when we take as input the worker quasi-stable matching above mentioned.

Suggested Citation

  • David Cantala, 2002. "Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200201, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Jun 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:gua:wpaper:ec200201
    as

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    File URL: http://economia.ugto.org/WorkingPapers/EC200201.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ahmet Alkan, 2001. "original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 99-111.
    2. , & ,, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
    3. Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2004. "Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 358-376, April.
    4. Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Qingyun & Roth, Alvin E., 2018. "The lattice of envy-free matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 201-211.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Senior Mathing Models;

    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

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