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Pourquoi des politiques de concurrence ?

  • Marc Deschamps


Le thème des fondements des politiques de concurrence est faussement élémentaire. En effet, il renvoie d’une part aux questionnements relatifs à l’utilité sociale et économique d’une politique de concurrence et, d’autre part à ceux ayant trait à la place des choix politiques. Au-delà de tous les particularismes, il est défendu dans cet article l’idée que les économistes justifient actuellement l’existence, à travers le monde, de politiques de concurrence par leurs effets soit sur la croissance, soit sur la stabilité de l’ordre social. En étudiant ces deux fondements principaux, nous tenterons de démontrer qu’il en ressort que (a) l’existence d’une politique de concurrence n’est pas une nécessité universelle, (b) il n’est pas souhaitable d’uniformiser toutes les politiques de concurrence existantes dans le monde et, (c) les politiques de concurrence (et non la justice concurrentielle) ne peuvent être automatisées ou confiées à des experts, mais doivent résulter directement ou indirectement de choix politiques. Ces conclusions offrent dès lors des pistes de réflexion différenciées notamment pour les pays développés, les pays en transition, et les pays en développement.

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Paper provided by Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis in its series GREDEG Working Papers with number 2013-23.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2013
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Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2013-23
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